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The Axiological Structure in 
Psychosis
Francisco Martín-Murcia and Adolfo J. Cangas
Abstract
In this chapter the value structure will be described as one of the essential 
existential foundations from a phenomenological perspective. Psychosis could be 
understood as the result of structural modifications of the self in anchoring the 
lifeworld. These modifications would mainly be due to failure in the construction of 
intersubjectivity and therefore of the common sense or basic intuitive tuning of the 
social world. This failure precisely involves the axiological component of psychotic 
being-in-the-world, so its description will be emphasized, along with its peculiari-
ties and similarities to other ways of functioning of this axis of values, both adapted 
and pathological. This approach will be observed in terms of its therapeutic possi-
bilities for the improvement and removal of the so-called negative symptoms. These 
are the warhorse for true recovery, understood as a personal and unique process for 
the clarification, development, adjustment of attitudes and values, affectivity and 
skills in social roles that can lead to a satisfactory and hopeful way of life. Those 
interventions that try to create a new existential situation or being-in-the-world 
will be described.
Keywords: Phenomenology, Psychosis, Schizophrenia, Values, Psychotherapy
1. Introduction
1.1 Theoretical foundation
Attempting to summarize the value structure in psychosis first requires defining 
three concepts: structure, values, and psychosis. Structure is understood as the rela-
tionship maintained between the different parts of a whole or the way in which said 
parts are organized in relation to the whole. For the purposes of the subject addressed 
in this work, the parts which we are concern with would be values. Their structure 
would determine the whole, which, as will be explained, is a reference to the human 
person [1, 2].
What are values? According to axiology—the philosophical discipline based on 
the value of things—values can be defined as those aspects that give meaning to 
things. Together, they will determine the behavior of an individual, depending on 
the importance they possess. Thus, values can be conceptualized as those attitudes 
whose function is to regulate our behavior. Surprisingly, however, despite being a 
key aspect in the construction of the individual, values have scarcely been studied 
in the field of psychosis [3].
The final element to define would be psychosis. The definition presented here 
will not address the well-known formal diagnostic systems (DSM-5 and ICD-11), 
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albeit they are also classically discussed [4]. Instead, following a more phenomeno-
logical description, psychosis is understood more as a peculiar construction of the 
being-in-the-world, whose essential manifestation would be the “loss of common 
sense” or of natural evidence, caused by, among other factors, focusing on psycho-
logical processes that go unnoticed in other people [5, 6].
In this sense, it is also worth considering that the positive symptoms in psychosis 
(e.g., hallucinations, delusions, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior) could 
well be the manifestation of more basic characteristics related to negative symp-
toms. Apathy, abulia and demotivation could in turn be the result of the lack of 
anchoring and fitting in with to the interests or social values of other people. In fact, 
it could be said that these negative symptoms are not simply located in the realm of 
affectivity; instead, they would exist as result of the specific relationship that the 
individual maintains with the oneself and towards the world. Both are not given 
separately or added but are to be understood as the basic being-in-the-world.
From this perspective, psychosis would be understood as the result of structural 
modifications of the self in its anchoring in the world-of-life, given the flaw in the 
construction of intersubjectivity and therefore common sense, understood as the 
basic intuitive tuning with the social world [6, 7].
1.2 Therapeutic approaches
In fact, the therapy session itself, not focused on the symptom, is the context 
that would present an opportunity for the development of intersubjectivity. The 
patient would have the chance to learn to feel what it is like to have things in com-
mon with others and experience feelings of acceptance and everyday life. Not in 
vain, the self-in-company is the barometer of the being-in-the-world [5].
In this regard, it is noteworthy that in recent years a great deal of therapeutic 
efforts made among patients with psychosis and severe mental disorders have 
resulted in strategies aimed precisely at attempting to restructure life’s sense 
and, therefore, values. This approach leads to a more fulfilled life experience. For 
example, in the approach known as Open Dialog [8], listening emerges as a more 
important variable than the intervention method; it specifically allows the reduc-
tion of uncertainty while also revaluating the social support system. This grants 
greater responsibility to both the family and the patient to discuss life situations and 
to manage their lives more confidently.
Similarly, another alternative with phenomenological roots, practiced by mental 
health patients on their own, is the Power Threat Meaning Framework [9], a psy-
chiatric diagnosis process proposed by the Division of Clinical Psychology of the 
British Psychological Society. In this case, symptoms would be understood as sur-
vival strategies against adversities and their meaning would always be related to life 
circumstances. Faced with threats (in relationships, identity, values, discrimination, 
emotions) generated by negative impacts of power (biological, coercive, legal, eco-
nomic, cultural, interpersonal, or ideological forces), the patient will attempt to assign 
them meaning (beliefs, feelings, and physical reactions) and respond to them. These 
responses may include aggressive behavior, unusual sensory perceptual or cognitive 
experiences, catatonia, dissociation, hearing voices, weakness, affective flattening, 
indifference, submission, paranoia, panic, depersonalization or derealization, among 
others. The aim of this framework is to gather strength, enhance the socio/family 
support resources of each patient, in order to empower them and rebalance their life 
according to the values of justice, equity, personal safety, belonging, direction and 
agency. In this way, this approach would help patients to have an existence with sense, 
meaning and purpose. The above examples involve the generation of contexts that can 
revaluate existence, beyond traditional bio-medical framework.
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In addition, it can also be proposed that delusions, alterations in discourse, the 
experience of corporeality and the temporality, paranoidal or schizoidal ways of 
interacting would be —once the phase of confusion had been overcome—completely 
self-evident to the psychotic person. This would be their personal “anchoring in the 
life-world”. The need to anchor oneself —to be anchored—would imply that these 
phenomena would be evident to those individuals who lack common sense or the 
sense of belonging to the world of others. In fact, the human person model by [1] 
emphasizes the idea that the psychotic experience is a prototypically universal effort 
to construct a valuable and authentic sense of the self.
1.3 Life experiences of psychotic patients
However, any specific characteristics would stem from the complex experi-
ences of the psychotic self which distance it precisely from certain socially adaptive 
values. They would therefore become barriers against achieving an acceptable level 
of wellbeing. Aspects related to work, sentimental relationships, raising a fam-
ily, academic development and economic autonomy, leisure and social activities, 
health and general wellbeing tend to be either extraordinarily deficient or simply 
inexistent. It seems quite logical then that severe cases of psychosis appear during 
adolescence, precisely at a critical moment in the construction of the self. This 
development of the self would thus take place in the turbulent waters of the differ-
ent conflictive roles (even ambivalent and antagonistic) which the individual will 
face as they evolve as a person [2].
Late-life psychosis also tends to develop in conflictive contexts or in complex 
existential transits, which would require a personal transformation not exempt 
from difficulties and risks. The Heideggerian concept of the human being as a tran-
sient and rational being and, therefore, narrative would imply the idea that living is 
always difficult. Overvaluation of the inner experience would result in an ontologi-
cal catastrophe [10]. This private experience is a continuous flow of events, in which 
the event (“what arrives”) impedes any feeling of having completely experienced 
what occurred [11]. This prompts the individual to experience events as not their 
own (since they are not possessed, and instead simply appear). Such events tend to be 
the object of overvaluation or hyper-reflexibility, whereby psychotic self-reflection 
is the “active stinger of the soul” [12]. In addition, this hyper-reflexibility occurs in 
different psychopathological conditions [13].
The life experience of certain psychotic individuals would therefore not cease 
to be a continuous and complex component. And that idiosyncratic environmental 
and behavioral history is what influences the experience of remembering, think-
ing, or feeling in the present. This refers to the world in which people exist; this 
world would arrive before the ideas created about it. This implies, in the words of 
Heidegger, that the individual must first remain “under the empire of Others”.
The predefined types/models of life or values can be achieved, lived, under-
stood, or accepted or not. It must be noted that values, as the guiding horizon 
which human beings migrate towards, and are therefore ingrained in them as 
psychological beings, cannot be reduced to a process of reasoning. Values cannot be 
accessed analytically because they are there (whether we want them or not). Thus, 
it is deduced that values will naturally be conditioned by different social-relational 
aspects.
1.4 Values of psychotic patients
It is important to consider some of the values engrained in the world of a person 
with psychosis when analyzing values. As previously discussed, their world is 
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phenomenologically different from the common-sense world. It is normally associ-
ated with a sense of eccentricity or exceptional nature, which are believed to be 
“given”, not chosen. In fact, it is observed that the axiological structure in psychosis 
features a preeminence of eschatological values that give great meaning to the life 
experience of patients. Thus, the feeling of idionomia or exceptionality and radical 
uniqueness is quite common [3]; the psychotic individual gives a meaning to events 
upon which they build a special –exceptional— identity. The events regulate their 
consciousness and life action, orienting them towards metaphysical existential 
planes, perhaps with a different mission or purpose from the objectives or goals 
common to their social environment. In Jaspers words [12] “the patient is person-
ally important as a discoverer … his days are filled with meaningful mental work”. 
These eschatological values will be the center of gravity upon which the psychotic 
individual will sustain their actions and consciousness. This will remove them from 
other constitutive values which will probably remain frozen due to the enormity of 
their psychotic experience.
This disconnection from the pragmatic life and the distancing from the social-
family context prevent the psychotic individual from learning essential lessons 
for interacting with the world. This peculiar case of self-absorption is common in 
modern societies [14]. According to Taylor [15], the dissolution of moral horizons, 
as a paradigm of modern society, would leave life with no ground to anchor itself 
onto given the loss of the sense provided by said horizons. In this way life could 
become what Nietzsche would called “a pitiful comfort” [15].
For example, a value that is usually common in a person with schizophrenia 
is spirituality. Their urgency to show it to others is common, so it is shared with 
everyone. As the objective of proselytism is to be praiseworthy a priori, it can also 
be characterized by a lack of empathic intuition; possibly generating a history of 
social rejection. These idiosyncratic values should not be easily confused with 
abnormal beliefs. Instead, they must be recognized as the world of the person in 
order to be modulated or adjusted in therapy [16]. This adjustment process would 
help the patient to untangle themselves from this egoic existential position. In turn, 
self-reflexivity would partially cease, allowing them to go beyond the oneself. This 
would result in an axiological reconstruction of the self by the Self-for-Others. The 
goal is not to invalidate the spiritual proselytism position, which is legitimate (we 
must remember that eschatological missions are not chosen sensu stricto, but are 
experienced as given), but rather to learn to experience sharing life, with no other 
function than to being-in-the world.
1.5 What patients suffer from
A common observation in the literature on the social integration of individuals 
with acute psychosis is the existence of severe problems with socio-labor insertion, 
intimacy, interpersonal communication, and sexuality. This results in a high level of 
suffering, which is substantially reduced when changes take place in these aspects 
[17]. The issue is that the lack of social experiences (from avoiding rejection, 
stigma, being misunderstood, etc.) impedes learning; it also complicates personal 
orientation towards other personal values. These are precisely the values which 
could be addressed at certain moments of the therapeutic process.
Survival against stigma, exclusion, and failure, due to the limitations that patients 
with psychosis suffer from, is a very complex situation. Competing within social 
function frameworks characterized by the paradigms of individualism and competi-
tiveness is a serious problem, whereby achieving a valuable identity is a very difficult 
accomplishment. Therefore, it is quite likely to experience feelings of failure, inad-
equacy, shame, and exclusion, which are indeed forms of personal suffering [9].
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Axiological structure will always involve a relationship of the world of the 
person with others. It involves social values that do not depend merely on individual 
decisions or processes; they are as much a part of the individual’s difficulties and 
interests as the actual characteristics of their world. It must be noted that the world 
is lived on occasions as a whole, making it important to reconstruct the “real” or 
objective world, which would include friends (probably limited in number), family 
(generally highly conflictive) and the general population (with high levels of 
stigma, social distancing and rejection). We must bear in mind that the clarification 
of the value system is not an analytical dissection.
The “existential ground” where the ethical-moral structure is generated is not 
a series of items or reasons [15]. It is evident that this structure can and must be 
chosen, fully committing to the direction that each human being must take in their 
life. However, it should be noted that axiological structure is already given to us in 
the world we exist in. Thus, this existential structure of the world-out-there should 
also be clarified and wholeheartedly accepted.
It is also important to bear in mind that certain values could be conflictive in 
personal development. Some components of modern culture, whose maxim is 
self-realization and therefore emphasizes being “true to oneself”, could specifically 
reinforce individualism and solipsist thinking. But this occurs not only in psychosis; 
eating disorders are an example of characterological formation based on perfection-
ism, control, and excessive individuation. Loyalty to that structure of egoic values, 
which can be useful on occasions, certainly limits and stifles existence itself [18]. 
Life could become clogged by a blindness to be “someone exceptional” (It will be 
pointed out, therefore, that any therapeutic effort should be directed to achieve a 
certain psychological flexibility that allows relativizing loyalty to this private world, 
above all if that position, both stubborn and defensive, distances the patient from 
the ordinary world of life).
2. Working with the axiological structure
2.1 Therapeutic dialog
In phenomenological approaches, it is understood that therapeutic sessions need 
not merely involve a logging of symptoms. Even initial phases, more focused on evalu-
ation and establishing connection, are potentially valuable and enlightening moments. 
They can be used as opportunities to search for meaning and recognition – key 
moments for understanding and clarifying the value structure – from which a great 
deal a person’s experience and actions originate [16].
As previously discussed, the therapeutic relationship itself is a magnificent 
opportunity to create a meaningful relationship. Even when listening and dia-
log first begins, contributions can be made towards developing a more robust, 
pre-reflexive self-awareness [19]. More than being in the presence of the con-
tents of consciousness, it is a form of being that comes before them. To achieve 
greater existential adjustment, a dialogical transformation must occur as living 
is tantamount to being-in-the-world. Intersubjectivity is enhanced during the 
process of mutual recognition, which is such a convulsive aspect of the psychotic 
experience. In this way, the value structure that moves the person can be under-
stood, making it possible to equip patients with greater psychological flexibility. 
This will be necessary to both identify values and reveal the common conflicts 
between them.
The key is, if axiological structure regulates behavior, then its adjustment will 
allow greater empowerment for a better existential commitment. The literature 
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establishes that psychological recovery among this population refers to establish-
ing commitments, which must focus on constructing a life with meaning, as well 
as a positive sense of identity. According to [20], the experience of oneself must 
be based on hope and self-determination. The therapeutic process encourages 
hope, redefines the identity based on an existential sense and helps the patient to 
take responsibility for their recovery. This must be approached as an ethical-moral 
orientation, that is, as a philosophy or life orientation [21]. Therapeutic progress is 
more than the reduction of positive symptoms; it is a way of being in front them, in 
front oneself and in front of the world-of-life.
2.2 Clarification of values
However, this world is difficult though because, as Jaspers states, living is a 
“controversy with the world”. There is always difficulty when reorganizing the value 
structure, whether addressing the level of confusion, disinformation, or disorga-
nization that the psychotic individual has over themselves. Yet, it is important to 
highlight one of the key life experiences in the existence of a person with psychosis: 
fear and suffering, in either the present (oppression, anguish, confusion, stigma) 
or co-present (avoidance of intimacy, apathy, laughter out of context, metaphysical 
stubbornness, distancing from the world).
An additional difficulty in the value identification process tends to be the defen-
sive disguising of intense malaise. That co-present fear, hidden or even buried in 
cognitive-emotional paralysis or in one’s own self-absorption, needs to be lived and 
made conscious so it may be elaborated, understood, and accepted. This is a basic 
therapeutic condition that makes it possible to advance beyond the unrevealing of 
personal values.
Even apathy could be understood as a way of being. The function of this way of 
being-in-the-world would provide a sort of anesthesia for feeling. When a feeling 
is incomprehensible, unmanageable, or experienced with strangeness, it is to be 
expected that they will flee from it. The proposal would be to face these phenomena 
of living; everything has a purpose, meaning and function. The conflicts derived 
from the experience of fear allow more effective access to the world of values and 
their personal worth [9].
If the experience of constructing a sense of the self is eminently intersubjective, 
it is necessary to create non-invalidating meeting spaces, both in the therapeutic 
setting and in the formation of natural groups. Experiencing identity includes an 
axiological structure that must be identified to produce a practical self-knowledge 
that allows the patient to know how to direct their own life. In this sense, it is worth 
noting that discussion about the meaning of values benefits from a natural frame-
work, featuring, for example, the participation of more therapists, mutual support 
groups and family, as in the Open Dialogue approach [8].
Giving the patient with responsibility implies respect for their opinions and 
their participation throughout the entire process. There is evidence of a therapeutic 
benefit showing that clinics help to generate different perspectives in which these 
values in conflict can coexist [22].
2.3 Values and therapy
Thus, therapeutic approaches that could offer an opportunity to identify axi-
ological structure in this population, observe conflicts between the values at play 
and empower the psychotic patient to deal with obstacles in order to have a life 
committed to said values, would be those which:
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• Seek to capture subjective aspects, namely, the phenomenological experience 
of the person, removed from psychopathological categories.
• Observe the complexity of life itself and explore feelings, values, personal 
meaning and experience.
• Accompany the patient in the difficult commitment of choosing their life, 
accepting the unfinished aspects of their life project.
• Disentangle from their mental processes when self-reflexivity fails to help 
them transcend.
• Allow ambiguity, as this will teach the patient to tolerate it.
• Successfully manage to make therapeutic contact truly meaningful, creat-
ing a comprehensive space that allows patients to feel and do from within 
themselves; therapist and patient can always present interpretations from the 
being-in-the-world of the patient (their self and the particular circumstances).
• Allow the patient to experience desperation, in order to understand their 
stagnation and the feeling of blocking or impairment of the horizon of their 
future; only from there can the patient collaborate in their own activation 
towards life, when that is precisely their goal.
• Follow the idiosyncratic scripts of life and that which occurs in therapeutic 
here-now relationships, rather than prejudicial constructs.
The therapist will be an example of Other in the relationship history of the 
patient; this will be crucial to the change process given the importance of Others 
in the construction of the person, as previously explained. For this reason, it will 
be necessary to address the basic components of the therapeutic session: material 
production (essentially verbal behavior, but other types of interpersonal behav-
iors as well, of course), analysis (essentially comprehensive) and the therapeutic 
relationship (alliance and closeness).
All resistance will be understood as kinds of behavior which make attempts 
at experiential avoidance. It will be necessary to understand and respect them so 
they can be addressed when the psychotic individual is ready. In this way will be 
reminded that these behaviors function as protective strategies that have been 
assigned meaning.
The change in therapy should not be directed to stop being who one is, but to live 
with another perspective in the face of the challenges of one’s own existence. Some 
of these challenges are the construction of a valuable identity and the search for 
meaning of what happens. And this will always be done on the fundamental basis of 
the person: the axiological structure of him.
3. Conclusion
The phenomenological perspective on how to understand psychotic problems 
makes it possible to stay ahead of phenomena precisely as they occur. Doing so 
avoids prejudiced constructs that obscure the there-given [23]. It eliminates repre-
sentational aporias and mechanistic paradigm removing them from the experiences 
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of patients with psychosis. In this way, models focused on the human person [1, 2] 
understand psychotic experiences as phenomena linked to normal psychological 
development.
People with psychosis will make a great effort to construct a valuable sense 
of themselves. They understand themselves according to their life experience, in 
which they construct their social identity and their self in a context; this is the 
being-in-the-world.
While making this effort, their behavior would deviate from practical actions 
in life, receiving responses of rejection, stigma, and failure, keeping them even 
further distanced and absorbed in their private events. Their axiological structure 
would remain in a state of adolescence or frozen.
The therapy process could help to clarify and endow the patient with more adap-
tive personal values. It is necessary to provide and find therapeutic settings that 
allow the meaningful experience of identity to be valuable, reconnecting the patient 
with the world-there-given as a horizon. It is important to make the transition from 
the prototypical monological life experience of schizophrenia to a dialogical one. 
The phenomenological approach is undoubtedly one of the most encouraging com-
prehension and intervention perspectives for this type of mental health problems. It 
is responsible for verifying that the recovery of negative and emotional symptoms, 
as well as the emotional component of psychotic experiences, are related to socio-
community functioning and obtaining a valuable life experience [24].
The phenomenological perspective would also be at the base of the new move-
ments in mental health. The Open Dialogue or Hearing Voices approaches emphasize 
the experience of the person and the problematic experiences. They allow to 
understand them in the social and family context. The processes of psychological 
change are related to present values.
Likewise, in phenomenological approaches the value of the symptoms is inserted 
in the life of the person. For this reason, the work on negative symptoms, basic in 
the axiological anchoring of the person, becomes highly relevant.
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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